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Abstract
In this paper, we continue our line of research for deﬁning an integrated framework for the speciﬁcation
and analysis of security and trust, aimed at providing the basis for the modeling and analysis of security
and trust aspects of emergent dynamic coalitions (e.g., mobile ad hoc networks, peer to peer systems,
web services). In particular, we consider two well-known languages: 1) the Role-based Trust-management
framework (RT ) and, in particular, its most basic language RT0, and 2) the transitive trust model, for
deﬁning trust and recommendation relationships. First, we show an encoding of the transitive trust model
into part of RT0; then, this subset is mapped into the inference construct of the Crypto-CCS process algebra.
Also, we introduce in the languages operators dealing with levels of trust. The relationships among these
languages could allow us to model and analyze trust and recommendation issues in distributed systems by
means of standard formal techniques, based on inference systems.
Keywords: trust management languages, process algebras
1 Introduction
In [14], we started an investigation about the development of a uniform framework
for the speciﬁcation and (automated) analysis for security and trust in distributed
protocols. In particular, it has been shown how the same machinery based on in-
ference systems used for the formal veriﬁcation of security protocols may be used
to analyze access control policies based on trust management systems (e.g., see
[3,6,16,11,20]). However, we did not show a full integration, since the same frame-
work could be used to express several theories, but not at the same time. For
instance, both the role-based trust management approach advocated in [11] and the
transitive trust model of [7,6] have been modeled. However, no attempt was made
to compare them or to integrate these two frameworks in a single one. Here, we
extend that work by providing an integrated inference system for describing both
1 Email: fabio.martinelli@iit.cnr.it
2 Email: marinella.petrocchi@iit.cnr.it
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 168 (2007) 191–205
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2006.12.005
1571-0661 © 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
trust and recommendation relationships. In doing so, we also relate the Role-based
Trust-management framework (in particular, the basic RT0, [11]) and the transitive
trust model of [7,6], by showing an encoding of the latter into part of the former. In
addition, we present a ﬂexible framework for giving metrics on trust relationships,
and we provide a suitable inference system modeling the uniﬁed framework that
results from our relationships.
Relating trust management languages and trying to unify trust features in a
pre-existent framework already dealing with security is particularly appealing for
our aims.
Indeed, dealing with trust and recommendation is a peculiarity of so called
dynamic coalitions, sets of electronic devices typically belonging to diﬀerent security
domains, and possibly driven by diﬀerent purposes, that should cooperate in order to
maintain active basic functionalities of the whole network. An example of a dynamic
coalition is a mobile ad hoc network: here, communication is typically multihop,
and all the nodes are called to actively participate in, e.g., routing functionalities,
i.e., they should forward packets towards a destination on behalf of the source.
There is no reason, however, to assume that the nodes in the network will eventually
cooperate with one another, since, e.g., network operation consumes energy, a scarce
resource in environments like ad hoc networks. Recently, researchers have proposed
several mechanisms based on trust, reputation and recommendation, in order to
enforce cooperation between nodes, [1].
Another interesting ﬁeld of application is the area of web services. Several au-
thors advocate the usage of formal methods, and in particular of process algebra,
to model web services and their composition (e.g., see [4,17]). Crypto-CCS, [12,13],
the language we have chosen to adopt for showing the attempt of a uniﬁed frame-
work modeling both security and trust, can implement several sets of inference rules.
Some of them can be considered not only for message manipulation, but also they
can encode complex reasoning systems aimed at describing preferences or attitudes.
Imagine a service that needs to interact with others. To protect itself from mali-
cious or selﬁsh services, it can previously collect information (often in the form of
cryptographic messages) on the behavior of others. Thus, an inference system may
be suitably used to express trust towards others, by means of direct experience, or it
can be used to infer trust relationships through recommendations of third services.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Next section recalls the Crypto-CCS
language. Section 3 recalls part of the RT family of languages for describing role-
based credentials. In Section 4, we rephrase, in a formalization more suitable for
our purposes, the transitive trust model proposed by [6,7]. Then, we propose a
simpliﬁcation of that trust model, in order to make it compliant to the basic lan-
guage RT0 in the RT family (Subsection 4.1). Subsections 4.2 and 4.3 adequately
extend our formalization with operators dealing with levels of trust, according to
the original intention of [6]. In Section 5, we show how the simpliﬁed trust model
can be naturally encoded into part of RT . Section 6 shows how Crypto-CCS can,
in turn, eﬃciently model the given encoding. Finally, Section 7 gives some ﬁnal
remarks.
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2 Crypto-CCS
Here, we recall syntax and semantics of the formal language Crypto-CCS ([12,13]).
The language consists of a (parametric) data-handling part and a control part.
The data-handling part consists of a message set Msgs and a (parametric) infer-
ence system. The set Msgs is deﬁned by the grammar:
m ::= x | b | F 1(m1, . . . ,mk1) | . . . | F
l(m1, . . . ,mkl)
where m ranges over Msgs, F i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ l) are the constructors for messages,
x ∈ V , a countable set of variables, b ∈ B, a collection of basic messages, and ki, for
1 ≤ i ≤ l, gives the number of arguments of the constructor F i. Messages without
variables are closed messages.
Inference systems model the possible operations on messages. These systems
consist of a set of rules r:
r =
m1 . . . mn
m0
where m1, . . . ,mn are premises (possibly empty) and m0 is the conclusion. An
instance of the application of the rule r to closed messages m1, . . . ,mn is denoted
as m1 . . . mn r m0. For each rule r and set of closed messages {m1, . . . mn}, we
assume that the set {m | m1, ..,mn r m} is decidable and that we can eﬀectively
establish whether it is empty or not.
The control part of the language deﬁnes terms standing for processes in a con-
current system. The terms are deﬁned as follows:
P,Q ::= 0| c(x).P | cm.P | τ.P | P |Q | P\L |
A(m1, . . . ,mr) | [〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule x]P ;Q
where m,m1, . . . ,mr are either closed messages or variables, c is a channel and L
is a set of channels. Both the operators c(x).P and [〈m1 . . . mr〉 rule x]P ;Q bind
variable x in P .
We assume the usual conditions about closed and guarded processes, as in [15].
We call P the set of all the Crypto-CCS closed and guarded terms. The set of
actions is Act = {c(m) | m closed and c ∈ I} ∪ {cm | m closed and c ∈ O} ∪ {τ} (τ
is the internal, invisible action), ranged over by a. We give an informal overview of
Crypto-CCS operators:
• 0 is a process that does nothing.
• c(x).P represents the process that can get as input a closed message m on channel
c behaving like P [m/x]).
• cm.P is the process that can send m on channel c, and then behaves like P .
• τ.P is the process that executes the invisible τ and then behaves like P .
• P |Q (parallel) is the parallel composition of processes that can proceed in an
asynchronous way but they must synchronize on complementary actions to make
a communication, represented by a τ .
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• P\L is the process that cannot send and receive messages on channels in L; for
all the other channels, it behaves exactly like P ;
• A(m1, . . . ,mr) behaves like the respective deﬁning term P where all the variables
x1, . . . , xr are replaced by the closed messages m1, . . . ,mr;
• [〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule x]P ;Q is the process used to model message manipulation as
cryptographic operations. Indeed, the process [〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule x]P ;Q tries to
deduce an information z from the tuple 〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 through the application of
rule rule; if it succeeds then it behaves like P [z/x], otherwise it behaves as Q.
The set of rules that can be applied is deﬁned through an inference system (e.g.,
see Figure 1 for an instance).
Crypto-CCS syntax, its semantics and the results obtained are completely paramet-
ric with respect to the inference system used. Figure 1 shows an instance inference
system to model message handling and public key cryptography: it allows to com-
bine two messages, obtaining a pair (rule pair); to extract one message from a
pair (rules fst and snd); to digitally sign a message m with a key k
−1 obtaining
{m}k−1 and, ﬁnally, to verify a digital signature on a message of the form {m}k−1
by applying the corresponding public key k (rules sign and ver, respectively).
In a similar way, inference systems can contain rules for handling the basic
arithmetic operations and boolean relations among numbers, so that the value-
passing CCS if-then-else construct can be obtained via the rule operator.
Example 2.1 Equality check among messages can be implemented through the
usage of the inference construct. Consider, e.g., the following rule:
x x
Equal(x, x)
equal. Then, [m = m′]P (with the expected semantics) may be equiv-
alently expressed as [m m′ equal y]P where y does not occur in A. Similarly, we
can deﬁne inequalities, e.g., ≤, among numbers.
The operational semantics of a Crypto-CCS term is described by means of the
labelled transition system (lts, for short) 〈P, Act, {
a
−→}a∈Act〉, where {
a
−→}a∈Act
is the least relation between Crypto-CCS processes induced by the axioms and
inference rules of Figure 2.
3 RT : A Family of Languages for Trust Management
In the RT family of languages, [11], credentials carry information on policies to
deﬁne attributes of principals by starting from assertions of other principals. RT
combines the strenghts of Role-based Access Control (RBAC), [18], by inheriting
the notion of role, interposed in the assignment of permissions to users, and of
Trust Management, [3], by inheriting principles for managing distributed authority
through credentials.
Thus, in RT a central concept is the notion of role. A role is formed by a
principal and a role term. If principals are denoted as A,B,C... and role terms
are denoted as r, r1, r2..., then A.r is role term r deﬁned by principal A. A role
may deﬁne a set of principals who are members of this role, and each principal A
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m m′
(m,m′)
(pair)
(m,m′)
m
(fst)
(m,m′)
m′
(snd)
m k−1
{m}k−1
(sign)
{m}k−1 k
m
(ver)
Fig. 1. An example inference system for public key cryptography.
(inp)
m ∈ Msgs, m closed
c(x).P
c(m)
−→ P [m/x]
(out)
m ∈ Msgs, m closed
cm.P
cm
−→ P
(int)
τ.P
τ
−→ P
(\L)
P
c(m)
−→ P ′ c 	∈ L
P\L
c(m)
−→ P ′\L
(|
1
)
P1
a
−→ P ′1
P1 |P2
a
−→ P ′1 |P2
(|
2
)
P1
c(x)
−→ P ′1 P2
cm
−→ P ′2
P1 |P2
τ
−→ P ′1 |P
′
2
(Def)
P [m1/x1, . . . ,mn/xn]
a
−→ P ′ A(x1, . . . , xn)
.
= P
A(m1, . . . ,mn)
a
−→ P ′
(D)
〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule m P [m/x]
a
−→ P ′
[〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule x]P ;Q
a
−→ P ′
(D1)
	 ∃m s.t. 〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule m Q
a
−→ Q′
[〈m1, . . . ,mr〉 rule x]P ;Q
a
−→ Q′
Fig. 2. Structured Operational Semantics for Crypto-CCS (symmetric rules for |
1
, |
2
and \L are omitted)
deﬁnes who are the members of each role of the form A.r. Also, roles can be seen as
attributes, i.e., a principal is a member of a role if and only if it has the attribute
identiﬁed by the role, [11].
In the following, we recall the basic statements of the RT family.
3.1 RT0
The most basic language in RT family was presented in [11]. In RT0 the statements
take the form of role deﬁnitions.
• A.r ← D (simple member)
A and D are (possibly the same) principals. The statement deﬁnes that D is
member of role A.r, or, equivalently, A says that D has attribute r.
• A.r ← B.r1 (simple containment)
A and B are (possibly the same) principals. r and r1 are (possibly the same) role
terms. With this statement, A deﬁnes all members of role B.r1 to be members of
role A.r. In other words, B.r1 is a more powerful role than A.r, since everybody
who has role B.r1 automatically has role A.r. Alternatively, we may say that A
delegates part of its capability to assign its role r to B. In terms of attributes,
the statement says that if B deﬁnes someone to have attribute r1, than the same
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has attribute r according to A.
• A.r ← A.r1.r2 (linking containment)
This statement deﬁnes a linked role. If B has role A.r1 and D has role B.r2,
then D has role A.r. In terms of attributes, the statement says that, if A says
that B has attribute r1, and B says that D has attribute r2, then A says that
D has attribute r. Note that this works as a sort of attribute-based delegation.
Indeed, A recognizes to B the authority to assign attribute r2 not on behalf of
B’s identity, but on behalf of some attribute r1 that B holds.
• A.r ← A1.r1 ∩A2.r2 (Intersection containment)
This statement deﬁnes that if D has both roles A1.r1 and A2.r2, then D has role
A.r.
Example 3.1 Consider the following set of credentials.
Shop.rentmovies ← Shop.user
Shop.user ← MP
The principal Shop rents movies to anyone who is a registered user of Shop itself.
Since the second statement assigns the role of a registered user to MP , then it
follows that principal MP has permission for having a movie rented.
3.2 RT1 and RT
C
1
In RT0, role terms do not take any parameters. RT1, [10], adds parameterized
roles. Indeed, a role term takes the form r(p1, . . . , pn), where each pi|1 ≤ i ≤ n is
a role parameter that can be either a constant or a variable, possibly ranging over
a set. The policy statements are the same as in RT0, except for the presence of
the parameters. Thus, if one considers, for the sake of simplicity, role terms with
single parameters, the policy statement for, e.g., the simple member and the simple
containment are as follows:
• A.r(p) ← D (simple member with parameter)
• A.r(p) ← A1.r1(p1) (simple containment with parameters)
In the simple member statement A and D are possibly the same entities. In the
simple containment statement A and A1 are possibly the same entities and r(p) and
r1(p1) are possibly the same role terms.
Example 3.2 Consider the following credential ([10]):
Alpha.evaluator(?employee) ← Alpha.manager(?employee)
This expresses the fact that a company Alpha allows the manager of an employee
to evaluate an employee (the question mark expresses a variable).
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In [9] it is also introduced a constraint-based extension of RT1, called RT
C
1 ,
that will be considered in Subsection 5.1. RTC1 allows some kinds of costraints on
parameters.
4 The Transitive Trust Model
Here, we give a formalization of the transitive trust model proposed by Jøsang et
al., [6,7]. Part of the formalization has been given in [14]. Here, we recall and
extend it by introducing a rule for the management of the recommenders.
The formalization we are going to give describes the trust model within a series
of inference rules, that will allow us to manage trust relationships by means of
standard mechanisms (i.e., with the same mechanisms used with process algebras
and similar methodologies, see, e.g., [5]). Moreover, by using an encoding based
on inference rules, the comparison between the transitive trust model and the RT
family of languages, which we are going to give in the following sections, will result
more natural.
The transitive trust model in [6,7] has been introduced according to the consid-
eration that trust is always linked to a purpose. The most natural situation is when
one trusts another for performing a certain function/task. In the model, we denote
A
f
−→ D as the situation in which A trusts D for performing function f . Moreover,
it is often common that principal A asks principal D to suggest/recommend a third
one for doing a given task, e.g., f . This could be expressed by credential A
rf
−→ D.
Thus, one can easily recognize a diﬀerence in the use of such credentials, the
former involving a sort of functional trust (e.g., A trusts D for actually doing
something), the latter asserting trust towards a recommendation, i.e., towards a
third party’s opinion about capabilities of someone else to do something.
In other words, when one calculates whether a given chain trust exists, it must
always consider that the last step in the chain is a functional trust one, while possible
other steps are recommendation steps. A third kind of credential in the model is
A
r
−→ B
f
−→ D, asserting that A trusts D for performing f via the recommendation
of B (there could be a chain of recommendations, not explicitly shown here).
Thus, the trust model can be described by the following rules:
A
f
−→ D (1) functional trust
A
rf
−→ D (2) recommendation
A
rf
−→ B B
rf
−→ D
A
rf
−→ D
(3) transitivity
A
rf
−→ B B
f
−→ D
A
r
−→ B
f
−→ D
(4) functional trust
via recommendation
A
r
−→ B
f
−→ D A
r
−→ C
f
−→ D
A
r
−→ {B} ∪ C
f
−→ D
B /∈ C (5) set of recommenders
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Rule (1) and (2) are the basic credentials of the model. Rule (3) expresses the
transitivity of a recommending chain, i.e., if A trusts B for a recommending for
a certain purpose and B trusts D analogously, then A can directly trust D for
recommending for that purpose. (Note that it is not required that direct trust is
transitive in this model.) Rule (4) says that, if A trusts B for recommendation and
B trusts D for doing f , then conclusion is that A trusts D for doing f through
B’s recommendation. The conclusion of rule (4) gives premises for a ﬁfth rule,
newly introduced by us. Rule (5) says that, if A trusts a set C of recommenders for
recommending someone for doing f and A trusts recommender B /∈ C for the same
purpose, then A trusts the enlarged set {B} ∪ C. This rule permits to explicitly
represent the sources of trust from A to D.
4.1 A Simpliﬁed Transitive Trust Model
Considering RT , it should be noted that no explicit relation appears, involving more
than two principals. On the other hand, the transitive trust model can express both
recommendation and direct functional trust, and, in particular, a trace still exists
of the recommender (see, e.g., rule (4), Section 4).
In our attempt to relate the two languages, and limiting ourselves, in this ﬁrst
attempt, to consider only the basic language RT0, we should give coherence to the
translation. Thus, an immediate idea is to simplify the trust model of Jøsang et
al.. Actually, A
r
−→ B
f
−→ D asserts that there is a sort of indirect functional
trust from A to D via B. One can simplify this at the cost of losing information on
recommenders.
Consequently, rule (4) is simpliﬁed as follows:
A
rf
−→ B B
f
−→ D
A
f
−→ D
(4*) indirect functional trust
The newly introduced rule says that if A trusts B for recommendating a third one
for doing f and B trusts D for performing f , then A trusts D for performing f .
Obviously, by adopting rule (4*) in place of rule (4), the simpliﬁed trust model
consists of the three ﬁrst rules and rule (4*), while rule (5) is not included into the
simpliﬁed model (by losing information on recommenders it appears nonsense to
have a rule for aggregating the recommenders).
4.2 Extending the Model with Trust Measures
The transitive trust model in [6,7] can be enriched with measures of trust. In
such a way, credentials are enhanced in order to express not only the fact that a
principal trusts someone for performing f or for a recommendation, but also they
specify the degree of this trust. Then, by applying a rule, one can derive the trust
measure of the resulting conclusion by adequately combining the trust measures of
the premises.
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As an example, consider a credential enhanced with a trust measure, e.g., A
f,v
−→
B. This could be read as follows: A trusts B for performing f , with a certain degree
v. Thus, v gives the measure of how much A places conﬁdence in B. The extension
of the model with measures holds also for the credentials about recommendation,
i.e., notation A
rf,v
−→ B means: A trusts B for recommending someone else able
to perform f , with a certain degree v. Trust measures are hereafter denoted as
v, v1, v2, . . . , w.
In [6,7], the authors suggest that there must be explicit rules for combining trust
measures either when dealing with transitivity of trust (e.g., rule (3)), or in presence
of multiple paths (e.g., rule (5)), or when dealing with a chain of recommendation
steps followed by a last step concerning with functional trust (e.g., rule (4) and (4*)
for the simpliﬁed model).
Aiming at following the original intention of [6,7], we try to introduce the rules
for combining the trust measures. Thus, we consider two operators, namely the
link operator ⊗ and the aggregation operator , for combining the trust measures.
Generally speaking, the former is used to compose trust paths, while the latter is
used to compare, select or aggregate trust paths.
In particular, we deﬁne the link operator ⊗ over rule (3) transitivity and over
rule (4) functional trust via recommendation, while the aggregation operator
 is deﬁned over rule (5) set of recommenders and, more generally, in case of
multiple trust paths. Below, we show the model enriched with trust measures and
rules for combining them.
A
f,v
−→ D (1)
A
rf,v
−→ D (2)
A
rf,v1
−→ B B
rf,v2
−→ D
A
rf,v1⊗v2
−→ D
(3) link 1
A
rf,v
−→ B B
f,w
−→ D
A
r
−→ B
f,v⊗w
−→ D
(4) link 2
A
r
−→ B
f,v
−→ D A
r
−→ C
f,w
−→ D
A
r
−→ {B} ∪ C
f,vw
−→ D
B /∈ C
(5) Aggregation -
set of recommenders
A
f,v1
−→ B A
f,v2
−→ B
A
f,v1v2
−→ B
(6) Aggregation
Remark 4.1 In order to have a coherent semantics, some conditions must be im-
posed on the link and aggregation operators. The ﬁrst, natural, requirement is that
⊗, denoting transitivity, must be associative, thus allowing to compute trust along
complex paths without taking care of the sub-paths evaluation order. Similarly,
 must be, in addition, also commutative, being the aggregation among two paths
not sensitive to operand order. Another desirable feature is that aggregation should
be idempotent. Some authors (e.g., see [19]) noticed that semirings, i.e., a triple
(M,,⊗), where  and ⊗ enjoy at least the previous properties plus additional
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ones (as the distributivity of ⊗ over ), could be used as a starting point to model
trust operators. This is not a surprise, since these structures are commonly used
for calculating weighted paths on graphs 3 . However, other features may be re-
quired that do not however change the overall kind of reasoning. For instance, an
additional requirement could be that trust degrades with links, thus requiring that
m1 ⊗m2 ≤ m1,m2 for a suitable ≤. In the following, we will use some instances of
these structures.
Example 4.2 link 1. Assume the interval [0, 1] of real numbers with the usual
multiplication operator, here denoted as ⊗, and the operator  that returns the
maximum between two real numbers. Suppose that A trusts B’s opinion for rec-
ommending someone able to perform f , with a certain degree v1=0.8. Suppose also
that B trusts D as a recommender for f with degree v2=0.7. Then, conclusion
is that A can directly trusts D as a recommender with a measure v3 = v1 ⊗ v2,
where ⊗ can be, e.g., the product operator. In this case, v3 =0.56, according to the
intuition that trust is transitive but decreasing.
Example 4.3 link 2. Suppose that A trusts B’s opinion for recommending some-
one able to perform f , with a certain degree v. Suppose also that B trusts D for
performing f with degree w. Conclusion must take into account both the level of
trust towards the recommender and the level of functional trust. Thus, A can trusts
D for performing f via B’s recommendation, with trust measure v ⊗ w, where ⊗
is, again, the product operator. Also in this case, indeed, a direct trust is greater
than trust derived trough a recommendation (assuming that a trust measure is a
positive value v |0 ≤ v ≤ 1).
Example 4.4 aggregation. Suppose that A trusts B as a good cook, with two
possible measures, v1 and v2. This could be possible since A could have collected two
possible opinions about the goodness of B as a cook, e.g., by means of recommenders
(not explicitly highlighted in the rule). Thus, A could choose to maintain a single
credential regarding B, by combining the two measures according to some operator
. For example, A could simply consider the maximum value between v1 and v2.
4.3 Extending the Simpliﬁed Model with Trust Measures
In this subsection, we show the simpliﬁed model of Subsection 4.1 enriched with
trust measures and rules for combining them. Rules (1), (2), (3) and the general
rule (6) are the same as in the above subsection, thus we omit to explicitly put
them. Clearly, rules (4) and (5) do not exist in the simpliﬁed model. Here, we
deﬁne the link operator over rule (4*).
A
rf,v1
−→ B B
f,v2
−→ D
A
f,v1⊗v2
−→ D
(4*) Link 3
3 See, e.g., [2] for other applications of semiring based techniques to security analysis.
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5 Encoding the Simpliﬁed Transitive Trust Model into
(Part of) RT0
Here, we show how to encode the simpliﬁed version of the transitive trust model
into part of RT0.
simplified trust model RT0
(1) A
f
−→ D A.f ← D
(2) A
rf
−→ D A.rf ← D
(3) A
rf
−→ B B
rf
−→ D
A
rf
−→ D
A.rf ← A.rf.rf
(4∗) A
rf
−→ B B
f
−→ C
A
f
−→ C
A.f ← A.rf.f
(i) The functional trust step of the model can be encoded into the simple member
role deﬁnition of RT0. The role term f represents the capability of performing
a service or a functionality that D is able to perform according to A. Thus, in
A.f ← D, A deﬁnes D to have role f , i.e., that D is able to perform f .
(ii) The recommendation step is again a simple member role deﬁnition in RT0.
Here, the role term rf represents the recommendation for doing a certain
service or functionality. In A.rf ← D, A deﬁnes D to have role rf , i.e., that
D is trusted for giving a recommendation to perform f .
(iii) The transitivity step is encoded into RT0 by a linking containment of the form
A.rf ← A.rf.rf . This statement says that if A deﬁnes B to have role A.rf ,
and B deﬁnes D to have role B.rf , then A deﬁnes D to have role A.rf , i.e.,
D is trusted to act as a recommender according to A. Thus, the role term rf
represents the recommendation.
(iv) The indirect functional trust step is encoded into RT0 by a linking containment
of the form A.f ← A.rf.f . A.f ← A.rf.f says that if B has role A.rf and C
has role B.f then C has role A.f . B who has role A.rf is the recommender,
i.e., A trusts B for choosing someone else that is trusted for performing f . C
who has role B.f is trusted to perform f according to B. It follows that C is
indirectly trusted to perform f according to A.
It is worthwhile noticing that the other kinds of credentials are not meaningful.
Indeed, in the simpliﬁed model we loose the information on the recommender. Thus,
RT0 becomes suitable to express interactions between the parties.
Remark 5.1 On a completely diﬀerent perspective, we may note that for the en-
coding in RT0, we just need the “simple member” and “linked containment” kinds
of credentials. This suggested us to investigate whether the set of credentials of RT0
is minimal or not. As a matter of fact, we noticed that simple containment may
be obtained by means of simple member and linked containment credentials, at the
cost of adding more roles. To express credential A.r ← B.r1, we may just add a
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special role rB and consider the two credentials A.rB ← B and A.r ← A.rB .r1.
5.1 Encoding the Simpliﬁed Transitive Trust Model with Trust Measures into (Part
of) RTC1
The simpliﬁed transitive trust model with trust measures can be encoded into RT ,
by exploiting the parameterized (and constrained) roles of RTC1 . Indeed, trust
measures can be inserted as parameters:
simplified trust model
with trust measures RT1
(1) A
f,v
−→ D A.f(v) ← D
(2) A
rf,v
−→ D A.rf(v) ← D
(3) A
rf,v1
−→ B B
rf,v2
−→ D
A
rf,v1⊗v2
−→ D
A.rf(v1 ⊗ v2) ← A.rf(v1).rf(v2)
(4∗) A
rf,v1
−→ B B
f,v2
−→ C
A
f,v1⊗v2
−→ C
A.f(v1 ⊗ v2) ← A.rf(v1).f(v2)
(6) A
f,v1
−→ B A
f,v2
−→ B
A
f,v1v2
−→ B
A.f(v1  v2) ← A.f(v1) ∩A.f(v2)
6 Crypto-CCS as a Trait d’Union
We now show how the inference construct of Crypto-CCS can naturally model the
encoding given in the previous section. For the sake of simplicity, we refrain from
reporting the correspondent credentials in RT and in the simpliﬁed trust model,
and we just report the correspondent labels.
The basic credentials of the transitive trust model (i.e., the functional trsut
and recommendation credential) and of RT0 (the simple member credential) can be
represented into Crypto-CCS as self-signed certiﬁcates of the following form:
{A,D, f}A−1
In this formalization, A,A−1 are, respectively, the public and private key of A.
Here, with a little abuse of notation, we overlap an identity and a public key. In a
self signed certiﬁcate, the person that created the certiﬁcate also signed oﬀ on its
legitimacy.
For the sake of readability, in the following we omit the identity of the authority
in the body of the signature, e.g., we write {D, f}A−1 instead of {A,D, f}A−1 .
First, we show the inference system that models the encoding given in Section 5,
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without trust measures.
(1) {D, f}A−1
(2) {D, rf}A−1
(3)
{B, rf}A−1 {D, rf}B−1
{D, rf}A−1
(4∗)
{B, rf}A−1 {C, f}B−1
{C, f}A−1
Rule (1) and (2) can be expressed into Crypto-CCS as self-signed certiﬁcates where
the private key of principal A speaks for A itself. For example, the term {D, f}A−1
says that A claims that D is trusted for performing f . The way through which
A guarantees for that assertion is the signature that is aﬃxed. Indeed, as it is
common in security protocols modeling and analysis, it is assumed that the private
key of a principal is never disclosed. Thus, A was the unique able to generate such
a signature.
Based on (1) and (2), one can express also transitivity of recommendation (3)
and indirect functional trust (4*).
Then, we show the inference system for the encoding of Subsection 5.1, with
trust measures.
(1) {D, f, v}A−1
(2) {D, rf, v}A−1
(3)
{B, rf, v1}A−1 {D, rf, v2}B−1
{D, rf, v1 ⊗ v2}A−1
(4∗)
{B, rf, v1}A−1 {C, f, v2}B−1
{C, f, v1 ⊗ v2}A−1
(6)
{B, f, v1}A−1 {B, f, v2}A−1
{B, f, v1  v2}A−1
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we investigated the possibility to use Crypto-CCS as a suitable mod-
eling language, not only for the standard capability of its inference rules to model
message exchange and manipulation, but also, and hopefully, for its expressive-
ness in deﬁning, along with its native security features, credential chains, trust and
recommendation relationships.
Along with Crypto-CCS, we considered part of two languages for deﬁning trust
and recommendation relationships, RT and the transitive trust model. By simpli-
fying the latter, we have shown a comparison between them, leading to the result
that, to some extent, part of one framework can be mapped into part of the other.
Also, the Crypto-CCS inference systems can express the resulting framework,
with new peculiarities representing levels of trust too.
The current investigation is an initial one, and further research is needed in
order to provide a more solid framework. In particular, we plan to extend our work
providing encoding correctness guarantees.
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Moreover, here a simpliﬁed version of the trust model has been considered,
in order to make it compliant with RT . This has the clear drawback that some
information is lost (in particular, information on the recommenders, that in some
application can be relevant), with respect to the original intention of [6,7]. Thus,
reﬁnements to the current work are possible through, e.g., the study of an extension
to RT dealing with recommenders. Furthermore, an encoding has been presented
from the simpliﬁed trust model to RT . The viceversa could also be considered, by
studying how to deal with aspects like intersection of roles.
Upon providing reﬁnements, we plan to extend the framework for enforcing
security policies (whose formal semantics is based on a variant of Crypto-CCS) in
GRID systems (i.e., see [8]) with mechanisms for managing also reputation and
recommendation information.
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